Salamanca, 1812 Page 5
The retreat to the Guarena is well described by George Simmons of the 95th Rifles:
The whole British army were in full retreat, the country all round was one vast plain, and the soldiers were moving across it in column of companies at quarter distance ready by regiments to form square if the enemy's cavalry should charge; the march was taken up literally as coolly as if it had been a field day, taking distant points to march upon, and avoiding the villages in order not to lose time passing through them. Upon our right as we then faced, and frequently not more than five hundred yards distant from us, was a dense mass of Frenchmen moving in the same order, horse, foot and artillery.39
Major John Burgoyne gives a similar account of the march of the Fourth Division in his journal, but still it was a retreat under pressure, and Charles Boutflower admits that ‘The enemy pressed us in a manner, and with a spirit, we were never before accustomed to.’40
It is not entirely clear whether or not the Guarena was generally fordable. British accounts make little of its passage, save as an opportunity to quench their thirst, and there is no suggestion that units were delayed while others defiled through narrow fords. On the other hand, Lieutenant-Colonel Castel, Clausel's ADC, describes searching for a ford for Taupin's infantry and Carrié's cavalry to cross. Castel's account is generally very interesting but unreliable: for example, he has Marmont take command of the army in the spring of 1812 rather than the middle of 1811, and believes that the battle of Salamanca was fought on 23 not 22 July, even describing fictitious manoeuvres to fill in the extra day. Still, if he describes searching for a ford he probably did so, and the explanation may be that the French were trying to cross the river downstream of the allied crossings; alternatively, the allies had time to find and mark the fords before their troops arrived at the river.41
Napier strongly criticizes Victor Alten's conduct in the face of Carrié's advance, blaming him for not charging the French as soon as they reached the allied bank of the river, and then attacking ‘feebly with successive squadrons instead of regiments’. Historians of the King's German Legion have defended Alten's conduct and claim that the light cavalry were initially successful against the dragoons, but fell back to rally when confronted with French infantry.42 There is probably some truth in this – Burgoyne describes how the 14th Light Dragoons had some initial success then got into difficulties – but the letters of William Bragge and the journal of T. H. Browne provide compelling evidence that the light cavalry were thoroughly discomfited when the 3rd Dragoons advanced to support them.43
Wellington's dispatch makes it clear that the cavalry were already engaged when he arrived on the scene, and that he then ordered Cole to attack the French infantry. This sequence is supported by Burgoyne, and there is little doubt that Browne is mistaken in reversing the order of events.44
The best descriptions of the defeat of Taupin's division are quoted in the main narrative, but a few others may be added here. Charles Cathcart told Graham that the French ‘came up in very gallant style and stood the charge of the 40th Regt. until they came within about five yards of them when they were completely Routed and 200 Prisoners taken.’ Colin Campbell told Colonel Torrens that ‘Genl. Cole immediately advanced upon them and charged them with the Bayonet, put them to the rout and took upwards of 200 Prisoners, but his men were so much exhausted that they could not follow them far.’ While Edward Pakenham wrote that on the 18th ‘Cole acted with particular conduct and coolness.’ The only odd note comes from George Hennell – the Light Division officer quoted in the narrative – who says that the French advanced in close column and then deployed. This suggests that Cole's attack caught the French as they attempted to form line from column, but none of the other allied accounts confirms this, Hennell was probably not a witness and Castel's account, while difficult to follow, tends to contradict it.45
The allied casualty figures are based on the original return in the Public Record Office and are given in full in Appendix I. The figures given in Oman (Appendix XII, p. 607) are completely accurate except for those for Anson's brigade of light cavalry, where they are understated by a total of seventeen casualties. The correct total of 542 casualties is given in the brief casualty return in Wellington's Dispatches, while Tomkinson gives a detailed return which would be accurate if it were not for two obvious misprints. It is possible that the official figures slightly understate the Portuguese losses, most probably by not counting some lightly wounded officers and men. Almost 22 per cent of listed Portuguese casualties were killed, which is an unusually high figure, and contrasts with only 16 per cent of British casualties being killed. This question is further discussed in Appendix II.46
The calculations which lie behind estimates of French losses are explained in Appendix III. Briefly, we have two sources: Martinien's list of French officer casualties, which names individual officers killed or wounded on 18 July and which may be relied upon as accurate, if not absolutely complete; and the official French return of casualties suffered in the campaign as a whole, which significantly understates the true figure, probably by leaving out the lightly wounded who had returned to the ranks by the time that the return was drawn up. By comparing the two, we can make a rough estimate of the losses of each unit on 18 July. For example, if a cavalry regiment had ten officers and one hundred men killed or wounded in the campaign, and Martinien lists three of the officers as being wounded on the 18th and the remaining seven on the 22nd, it is reasonable to suppose than about thirty men were casualties on the 18th. Clearly this is only a rough guide, and there would be occasions when this assumption would be incorrect, but these oddities would tend to cancel each other out.
The combat of 18 July provides an interesting test of the various secondary accounts of the campaign. Napier is remarkably good for so early an account, and gains added interest from including his own impressions as a participant, but he greatly understates the scale of the infantry fighting between Cole and Taupin. Oman is excellent: full, detailed, lively and almost always convincing. Here, as with the battle of the 22nd, he provides by far the most reliable account of each stage of the fighting. Fortescue, however, is disappointing, particularly on the infantry fighting, where he states that only a single French battalion was engaged, despite the clear evidence in Martinien's lists that four French regiments lost quite heavily. Young and Lawford give a popular narrative composed largely of long quotations from Kincaid and Leith Hay; but Jean Sarramon's French account is excellent, mainly following Oman, but adding some fresh details, although it lacks some of the richness which Oman provides.47
Chapter Two
Armies and Generals
The two armies camped by the Tormes on the night of 21 July 1812 were almost equal in strength. The allied force was somewhat larger: 51,937 officers and men according to a return of 15 July, adjusted to include some reinforcements which arrived before the battle. But from this total about 1,200 men should be deducted for casualties suffered on the 18th, and men who had fallen out during the long hot marches since the army left the Duero. This gives a nominal strength of about 50,700 men, although the actual fighting strength would have been considerably less, for the return includes some non-combatants such as bandsmen and farriers, while every army contained a certain number of men whose courage failed them and who found their way to the rear whenever serious fighting appeared imminent. It is impossible to quantify this problem even roughly; but good discipline and good morale – and Wellington's army had both – kept it to a minimum.1
The French army was a little weaker, with a nominal strength of just under 47,000 men on the morning of the 22nd. Again the last reliable figures date back to 15 July, and so include men who fell out on Marmont's long marches, or who were wounded or killed in the fighting on the Guarena. The return gives the following totals:
French Army, 15 July 1812
Infantry 41,525 or 84 per cent of the army
Cavalry 3,379 or 7 per cent of the army
Artillery 3,437 or 7 per cent of
the army
Miscellaneous 1,306 or 3 per cent of the army
49,647
About half the ‘miscellaneous’ were non-combatants, but this is taken into account in estimating the fighting strength of the army. The equivalent figures for Wellington's force are (including the Spanish division):
Allied Army, 15 July 1812
Infantry 45,406 or 87 per cent of the army
Cavalry 4,985 or 10 per cent of the army
Artillery 1,300 or 2.5 per cent of the army
Miscellaneous 246 or 0.5 per cent of the army
51,937
Infantry thus dominated both armies to a much greater extent than in Napoleon's battles in central Europe, where cavalry usually formed about 15 per cent of the armies, but conditions in the Peninsula were particularly harsh on horses. Marmont had seventy–eight guns compared to Wellington's sixty-two (including a Spanish battery). However, the French guns were a surprisingly mixed collection: only seven of the famous 12-pounders, twenty-one 8-pounders (equivalent to British 9-pounders), thirty-six old 4-pounders (a mixture of French and Spanish pieces), a single 3-pounder and thirteen howitzers. In other words there was only one battery of 12-pounders, and three of 8-pounders; the rest of Marmont's guns were light pieces normally reserved for horse artillery. Larmartinière's return of losses surprisingly suggests that guns of different calibres were mixed together in the same battery (see below, Chapter 11, p. 211). Wellington's guns were less unexpected: fifteen 9-pounders, thirty 6-pounders, nine 5½-inch howitzers (one per battery), six 24-pounder howitzers, and two 4-pounders with the Spanish cavalry.2 Three 18-pounder siege guns were sent to the rear.3 The French batteries generally contained eight guns; the allies' six. By the standards of Napoleon's battles, where there were often three, four or even more guns per thousand troops in the army, both forces at Salamanca were noticeably under-strength in their artillery.
If Marmont's artillery were clearly superior, this was more than offset by the strength of the allied cavalry. This difference was even greater than the simple numbers suggest, for Wellington's cavalry were in fine condition and included five regiments of heavy dragoons, whose primary purpose was to deliver powerful charges in battle: their value was to be clearly demonstrated over the next two days. By contrast the French cavalry were a mixture of dragoons and light cavalry – general-purpose horsemen capable of good service in battle if a favourable opportunity arose, but usually lacking the weight and esprit de corps to create opportunities for themselves.
It was most unusual in the Peninsula for the French not to have a distinct advantage in cavalry, and they were accustomed to their horsemen converting a Spanish defeat into a rout or ensuring success if the day was doubtful. This weakness caused them great anxiety – it is often emphasized in French memoirs. Marmont had done what he could to solve the problem, by appealing to Caffarelli and King Joseph, by raiding a convoy of reinforcements intended for Soult and by commandeering several hundred horses owned by infantry officers over and above the number officially allowed. He paid compensation for these, but even so this move was extremely unpopular. The horses were used to mount hundreds of chasseurs and dragoons who were otherwise standing idle in nearby depots, but their effectiveness must be doubted: not only were horse and rider strangers, the horses themselves were untrained in cavalry movements, or in acting with other horses. Marmont's cavalry was thus far weaker than it appears, and the boldness of his campaign was commensurately greater.
The difference in quality between the infantry of the two armies is much less marked. Marmont's was a homogeneous national force, without any significant foreign element, while the allies were much more mixed: not only were there British, Portuguese and Spanish components, but the ‘British’ element included the German regiments of the King's German Legion, generally good troops, and two regiments of assorted foreigners, the Brunswick Oels and the Chasseurs Britanniques, who were less reliable. Genuinely British troops thus amounted to marginally less than half the army, while there were more Germans than Spaniards at the battle. On the other hand, if we exclude the relatively small Spanish force (3,360 all ranks), which did not play an important role in the battle, the rest of the army had seen considerable service under Wellington and had built up a tradition of success. British officers differed in their opinion of the Portuguese, who comprised one-third of the army. One stated in his memoirs that they lacked ‘that esprit necessary to encounter even the French riflemen’, while only the British veterans were able ‘to withstand a regular attack from a French column’; but another wrote home shortly after the battle that the ‘action was fought chiefly by the Portuguese and they behaved in a manner which could not be excelled’.4 The truth lies between these two extremes, but rather closer to the latter than the former. In the battle the Portuguese proved to be good troops, and only gave way in circumstances where British troops might also have been broken. In general they were almost, but not quite, as reliable as the British, and took their fair share of the fighting. Indeed, they actually lost proportionally more casualties than the British.
Allied Army, 15 July 1812
British 30,578 all ranks, or 59 per cent of the army
Portuguese 17,999 all ranks, or 35 per cent of the army
Spanish 3,360 all ranks, or 6 per cent of the army
51,937 all ranks
(Of the 30,578 ‘British’, 5,651 or 18 per cent were in the KGL or other foreign regiments.)
In the summer of 1812 French armies still had immense prestige and confidence in themselves. The soldiers may have hated the war in Spain, but they had a proud tradition to maintain and Napoleon's victories, propaganda and fame gave them good reason to believe that they were the best troops in the world. Nonetheless the glorious days of Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland were now a distant memory, and years of hard campaigning had blunted the sharpness of the troops and eroded their spirit. They were still good soldiers, far better than most of the motley horde Napoleon was leading into Russia; still capable of enthusiastic attack, tenacious resistance and a surprising level of tactical flexibility. On the other side, Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese infantry had established its reputation largely by defending strong positions, and its ability to manoeuvre and attack on a large scale was untested. With hindsight it seems fair to say that the Anglo-Portuguese infantry had a clear advantage over their French counterparts in battle, although not necessarily on campaign or in adversity. However, this difference in quality was not overwhelming, nothing like the enormous gap which was so apparent in the following year; nor was it at all obvious on the eve of the battle.
Marmont's army was organized into eight divisions of infantry and two of cavalry. Each of the infantry divisions was divided into a neat hierarchy of brigades, regiments and battalions: two brigades to each division, usually two regiments to each brigade (though a few had only one), and two or three battalions to each regiment. In all there were 29 regiments and 73 battalions of infantry, each of the battalions having an average strength of 568 officers and men. The strongest divisions were Clause's (6,562 all ranks on 15 July) and Bonnet's (6,521 all ranks); the weakest were Thomières's (4,543 all ranks) and Taupin's (4,558 all ranks). These totals include the artillery that formed a part of each division, usually amounting to about two hundred men.
The bulk of Marmont's force consisted of the remains of the army which Masséna had led into Portugal in 1810. A few of Masséna's units had been sent home: two weak foreign regiments, the Légion du Midi and the Hanoverian Legion; one good regiment of French infantry (32nd Léger); and seven weak 4th battalions, whose men had been drafted into other regiments and the cadres returned to the depot.5 However, Masséna's losses had been so great that two complete divisions had to be added to make the French roughly equal to Wellington's force. These were Thomières's division, which arrived from Italy in the second half of 1811 under General Souham, and Bonnet's division, which had been in Biscay and Asturias since 1808. The regiments of Thomières's division were old unit
s with good reputations. They had served in the war of 1809 against Austria, including at Wagram, and had then had time to recruit their strength before being sent to Spain.6 They should have been among the best units in Marmont's army. Bonnet's regiments had a less distinguished pedigree, for their origins lay in the provisional regiments and supplementary legions which made up Bessières's corps in 1808; but four years of active if desultory service in trying conditions seems to have bonded the men together and made them eager to perform well in this, their first large battle.7
Most of Marmont's men were veteran soldiers, but they were not the victors of Austerlitz. Of his twenty-nine regiments of infantry, only two had been present at Napoleon's greatest victory (17th Léger in Taupin's division, and 36th Ligne in Sarrut's division), although another two had contributed battalions d'élite to Oudinot's grenadiers (2nd and 31st Léger, Sarrut's and Ferey's divisions). Nine further regiments had been part of the Grande Armée of 1805 but not present at Austerlitz (4th, 6th and 25th Léger and 27th, 39th, 50th, 59th, 69th and 76th Ligne: all of Foy's and Clausel's divisions, and 4th Léger in Sarrut's). The regiments comprising the two divisions under Foy and Clausel had been together since the projected invasion of England and the formation of the Grande Armée. They had been part of the 6th Corps, had benefited from Ney's careful training and had shared mixed fortunes in many campaigns since then. Their long and surprisingly stable association must have encouraged a degree of confidence and esprit de corps extending beyond the regiment to these higher formations.