Salamanca, 1812 Read online

  Remarkably, seven of Marmont's regiments appear never to have faced the British in action before the campaign began, while another four, including three which had taken part in the invasion of Portugal, had not been closely engaged with them. In other words, one-third of the army had little experience of being beaten by the British and so should not have been intimidated at facing them; while even the remaining regiments could, with some justice, feel that they were not to blame for the defeats at Busaco and Fuentes de Oñoro. The seven regiments which had not encountered the British were 22nd Ligne in Taupin's division, which went through the invasion of Portugal losing one-third of its strength to deprivation and disease without being seriously engaged; the three regiments of Thomières's division, 1st, 62nd and 101st Ligne; and three of the four in Bonnet's division, 118th, 119th, and 120th Ligne. The four with little prior contact with the British were 25th Léger and 59th Ligne in Clausel's division, the 65th Ligne in Taupin's division (all veterans of Masséna's invasion of Portugal) and the 122nd Ligne in Bonnet's division which had been in reserve at Coruña but had not fired a shot.8

  French Army at Salamanca

  1st Division (Foy)

  6th Léger, 39th, 69th and 76th Ligne (8 btns) 5,147 all ranks

  2nd Division (Clausel)

  25th Léger, 27th, 50th, and 59th Ligne (10 btns) 6,562 all ranks

  3rd Division (Ferey)

  31st Léger, 26th, 47th and 70th Ligne (9 btns) 5,689 all ranks

  4th Division (Sarrut)

  2nd and 4th Léger, 36th Ligne (9 btns) 5,002 all ranks

  5th Division (Maucune)

  15th, 66th, 82nd and 86th Ligne (9 btns) 5,244 all ranks

  6th Division (Taupin vice Brennier)

  17th Léger, 22nd and 65th Ligne (8 btns) 4,558 all ranks

  7th Division (Thomières)

  1st, 62nd and 101st Ligne (8 btns) 4,543 all ranks

  8th Division (Bonnet)

  118th, 119th, 120th and 122nd Ligne (12 btns) 6,521 all ranks

  Light Cavalry Division (Curto)

  3rd Hussars, 13th, 14th, 22nd, 26th and 28th

  Chasseurs and 1 Escadron de Marche (17 sqdns) 1,879 all ranks

  Heavy Cavalry Division (Boyer)

  6th, 11th, 15th and 25th Dragoons (8 sqdns) 1,696 all ranks

  Artillery Reserve etc 1,500 all ranks

  Miscellaneous 1,306 all ranks

  Total 49,647 all ranks

  (A more detailed order of battle is given in Appendix III.)

  Wellington's army had slowly grown since his return to the Peninsula in 1809. Its origins lay in a number of less good regiments which Moore had left in Portugal when he advanced into Spain. These had been heavily reinforced in the spring of 1809, giving Wellington the army of twenty thousand British troops which he had led to Talavera. A few units from that army had suffered so much in action or from the rigours of the campaign and disease that they had been withdrawn, but most remained. In the meantime Beresford had been busy reorganizing and re-training the Portuguese army with the assistance of a number of British officers. Early in 1810 Wellington reorganized his forces into five divisions, which had grown to nine by the spring of 1811: numbered one to seven, plus the famous Light Division and a Portuguese division. Of these, the Second and the Portuguese divisions were serving under Hill in Estremadura at the time of Salamanca.

  Most of these divisions consisted of two British brigades (each typically of three or occasionally four battalions) and one Portuguese brigade (two line regiments, each of two battalions, plus one battalion of caçadores or light infantry). Thus, a division might have six British and five Portuguese battalions, although on average British battalions were stronger than the Portuguese (572 all ranks compared to 471). However, there was considerable variation on this basic pattern. The First Division had no Portuguese, but three ‘British’ brigades – a brigade of Guards, a brigade of the line, and a brigade of the King's German Legion – while the Light Division contained only two battalions of caçadores, one attached to each of its two, numerically weak, brigades. Each division had its own force of light infantry, usually consisting of the caçador battalion from the Portuguese brigade, plus two or three companies of specialist light infantry from the 5/60th or Brunswick Oels battalions, which were scattered through the army for this purpose, and the light companies from the line battalions. In addition to these seven Anglo-Portuguese divisions, Wellington had two independent Portuguese brigades at Salamanca under Pack and Bradford (each having two line regiments and a battalion of caçadores) and Carlos de España's weak Spanish division.

  There were also six brigades of cavalry: four British and one Portuguese, under the overall command of Stapleton Cotton, and Julián Sánchez's Spanish lancers. There were two brigades of heavy dragoons: Le Marchant's brigade of three regiments, more than a thousand men and the most powerful single force of cavalry in either army, although puny compared to the divisions of cuirassiers and whole corps of cavalry which Murat was accustomed to command; and two regiments of the Heavy Dragoons of the King's German Legion under Bock. There were two brigades of British light cavalry under G. Anson and V, Alten, and a weak brigade of Portuguese dragoons under D'Urban – they were not nearly as dependable as the Portuguese infantry, and although they performed well on 22 July, they were put to flight a few weeks later at Majadahonda.

  Finally, there were ten batteries of artillery, eight British (including one King's German Legion), one Portuguese and one Spanish. Three of the British batteries were horse artillery attached to the cavalry, the Light Division and the Seventh Division. Five were foot artillery, attached to each of the other divisions, while the Portuguese battery of 24-pounder howitzers was held in reserve, and the Spanish battery was attached to España's division. Each of the batteries contained six guns (or rather, five guns and a 5 ½ inch howitzer); three of the foot batteries had 9-pounders (those attached to the First, Third and Fourth Divisions); the remainder, 6-pounders. Sánchez's lancers had two 4-pounders.9

  Allied Army at Salamanca Infantry:

  First Division (H, Campbell)

  two British and one KGL brigades (9 btns) 6,428 all ranks

  Third Division (Pakenham vice Picton)

  two British brigades (7 btns) 3,678

  one Portuguese brigade (5 btns) 2,197 (12 btns) 5,875 all ranks

  Fourth Division (Cole)

  two British brigades (5 btns) 2,674

  one Portuguese brigade (5 btns) 2,544 (10 btns) 5,218 all ranks

  Fifth Division (Leith)

  two British brigades (8 btns) 4,405

  one Portuguese brigade (5 btns) 2,305 (13 btns) 6,710 all ranks

  Sixth Division (Clinton)

  two British brigades (6 btns) 2,920

  one Portuguese brigade (5 btns) 2,631 (11 btns) 5,551 all ranks

  Seventh Division (Hope)

  two British brigades (6 btns) 3,017

  one Portuguese brigade (5 btns) 2,158 (11 btns) 5,175 all ranks

  Light Division (Charles Alten)

  two Anglo-Portuguese brigades (approx 6 btns)10 3,538 all ranks

  Pack's independent Portuguese brigade (5 btns) 2,607 all ranks

  Bradford's independent Portuguese brigade (5 btns) 1,894 all ranks

  Spanish Division (Carlos de España) approx. 2,410 all ranks

  Total Infantry 45,406 all ranks

  Cavalry:

  Le Marchant's brigade

  (3rd and 4th Dragoons, 5th Dragoon Guards) 1,032 all ranks

  Bock's brigade

  (1st and 2nd KGL Heavy Dragoons) 771 all ranks

  G. Anson's brigade

  (11th, 12th and 16th Light Dragoons) 1,004 all ranks

  V. Alten's brigade

  (1st KGL Hussars and 14th Light Dragoons) 746 all ranks

  D'Urban's Portuguese Dragoons

  (1st and 11th Portuguese Dragoons) 482 all ranks

  Julián Sánchez's Spanish Lancers

  (1st and 2nd Lanceros de Castilla and two 4-pounders) 950 all ranks<
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  Total Cavalry 4,985 all ranks

  Artillery 1,300 all ranks

  Miscellaneous 246 all ranks

  TOTAL 51,937 all ranks

  (A more detailed order of battle is given in Appendix II.)

  The Fifth Division was the strongest in the allied army, largely because it was joined by the 1st battalion, 38th Foot on the day before the battle, increasing its strength by eight hundred officers and men. This was the second strong regiment Wellington had received since the campaign began (the other was the 1/5th in the Third Division: 902 all ranks), together with a steady trickle of drafts and convalescents.11 So there were some inexperienced British troops in Wellington's army, but the great majority had seen a good deal of campaigning in the Peninsula and were acclimatized. The amount of fighting they had experienced varied more widely: the First Division had been heavily engaged at Fuentes de Oñoro in May 1811, while in 1809 – as Sherbrooke's division – it had borne the brunt of the great French attack in the centre at Talavera, and had very nearly been broken. The Third, under Picton's fiery leadership, had seen action at Busaco, El Bodon and, more recently, at the storming of both Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. The Fourth and Fifth were also fighting divisions: both had taken part in the storm of Badajoz; the Fourth had fought gallantly at Albuera, while the Fifth claimed much credit for its role at Busaco – a claim which was much resented by the officers of the Third. The Sixth Division had seen less combat until it undertook the siege of the Salamanca forts; it was probably a little raw, even though some of its regiments had been in the Peninsula for years. The Seventh Division contained a high proportion of foreign units: the two light battalions of the King's German Legion were good troops, but the Brunswick Oels and Chasseurs Britanniques were much less impressive. There were only two British regiments (the 51st and 68th) in the division, and both of these were very weak (307 and 338 all ranks respectively). The division had been much exposed at Fuentes de Oñoro and had successfully made a difficult retreat. It had also engaged creditably in the skirmishing at Morisco in front of San Cristobal in June, but it was still the least cohesive of all the Anglo-Portuguese divisions. Finally, there was the Light Division, whose numerous memoirists and authors – including most famously William Napier himself – never tired of extolling its virtues. But it was truly an elite force, excelling not only in the expected duties of light troops, such as skirmishing and managing the outposts of the army, but also in close fighting and manoeuvring in battle, and in taking a leading part in the bloody assaults on Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz.12

  The Portuguese troops had generally seen less service than the British: they had defended their positions well at Busaco, and the brigade attached to the Fourth Division had successfully advanced in line in the face of strong French cavalry at Albuera – a severe test of their discipline.13 But in general they, and to a lesser extent the army as a whole, had yet to prove their ability to manoeuvre and attack in good order in an open field.

  The commander of the French army was Auguste Frédéric Louis Viesse de Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, the youngest of all Napoleon's marshals. He was born on 20 July 1774, the son of minor nobility, and was always destined for the army. He was a man of lively intelligence and great organizational abilities; a fine administrator with a curiosity that extended far beyond purely military matters. He had been trained in the Artillery School at Châlons, and met his destiny at the siege of Toulon where he greatly impressed the young General Bonaparte and became one of his closest aides. Bonaparte's patronage gave him accelerated promotion and extraordinary opportunities, but also much heartache. Marmont was not a modest man; well aware of his abilities, perhaps even exaggerating them, he was ambitious and greatly resented any slight. When Napoleon created the marshalate in 1804, eighteen generals were given the honour. They included such distinguished veterans as General Kellermann (born 1735), who had commanded the army at Valmy, and each of the corps commanders of the army camped on the Channel coast except one: the thirty-year-old Marmont. He had never commanded an army in action, but he had distinguished himself at Lodi and at Marengo, he had accompanied Napoleon to Egypt and – a rarer honour – accompanied him on his return; he had proved his loyalty and usefulness in the preparation of the coup d'état of Brumaire; and had efficiently reorganized the whole French artillery. Considering some of the other names on the list, he felt he had good reason to be disgruntled, especially as he alone among the corps commanders was singled out as unworthy of the honour. But the list was already over-long, and included too many men whose abilities were not yet widely known and who were closely connected with Napoleon: Marmont was apparently too young, and too obviously Napoleon's protégé.

  Marmont's corps did not play a central part in the campaign of 1805, and he was not at Austerlitz. In 1806 he was sent to occupy Dalmatia, which had been ceded by Austria. Here he had considerable independence and enjoyed organizing the civil government, building roads and subduing bandits, achievements which were recognized when he was made Duke of Ragusa in 1808; but he was out of sight and Napoleon was winning great victories at Jena and Friedland. Marmont played a useful role in the war of 1809 against Austria, and after Wagram Napoleon made him a marshal at last, only to rob the reward of much of its sweetness by saying that it was granted for friendship, not ability. Marmont then returned to the Adriatic coast for another two years, governing the newly ceded Illyrian Provinces.14

  In 1811 Napoleon sent Marmont to Spain, where he joined the Army of Portugal two days after its defeat at Fuentes de Oñoro. The task facing him was immense: Masséna's army had not merely been defeated in battle, but starved and demoralized; its senior officers had feuded incessantly, and Masséna's leadership had not been inspiring. Marmont was the perfect new broom: he was young and enthusiastic, and this was his first command of an independent army. He abolished the corps and organized the army into independent divisions, removing one layer of authority between himself and the troops, and sent home several discontented senior generals who resented his being placed over them. He showed a practical concern for feeding his troops and reviving their spirits, and was rewarded with a surprisingly rapid revitalization of the army. As Wellington discovered repeatedly, French soldiers were extraordinarily tough and resilient; they seldom remained beaten for long.

  Marmont soon proved his ability in command of the army: his rapid march to aid Soult in June 1811 forced Wellington to lift the siege of Badajoz, while a few months later he not only broke the allied blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, but caught Wellington in some disarray at El Bodon. Nor was he greatly to blame for the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz in 1812, for his hands were tied by Napoleon's orders, and Wellington's preparations left little room for accident. More recently he had shown great skill and boldness in his advance from the Duero: he had outmanoeuvred Wellington and gained the moral ascendancy. But this proved his undoing: he grew overconfident and, after five days of intense concentration, he relaxed a little too soon.

  Assessments of Marmont vary and can be coloured by his betrayal of Napoleon in 1814. Given this, Napier's conclusion is surprisingly generous: ‘Marmont was a man to be feared. Quick of apprehension, courageous and scientific, he had experience in war, moved troops with great facility, was strong of body, in the flower of life, eager for glory and although neither a great nor a fortunate commander such a one as might bear the test of fire’.15 This is judging from events, and if it were not for the publication in 1900 of the diary of General Foy, commander of the 1st Division in the French army, we would have little reason to question Napier's opinion. Marmont speaks well of Foy in his memoirs; there was no quarrel between them. Indeed, Foy had been Marmont's chief of staff in 1805, which may account for the familiar, even patronizing, tone of his comments, for the diary appears genuinely to have been written at the time and therefore not influenced by the drama of 1814. It is thus the best source we have, although it must be remembered that it is only a single source, representing an individual's view, and even Wellington mi
ght appear in an unexpected light if viewed primarily through the eyes of Henry Clinton or Stapleton Cotton. Foy describes Marmont as ‘irresolution itself’:

  Ardent and enterprising when remote from danger he is frozen and apathetic when in its presence. In discussion he will not face up to difficulties, always seeking to by-pass them. … He is a good man, worthy and respectable, but he and others have entirely deceived themselves over the nature of his talent. He was not born to command an army. His face expresses too clearly the hesitation of his mind and the anxiety of his soul; the whole army knows his secret. He takes advice too often, too publicly, and from too many people. … Boinod, the Inspecteur en Chef aux Revues, said to me in 1806, ‘General Marmont is like Mont Cenis, in good times his head is clear and sunny; in times of storm it is covered in clouds.’16

  In a note written later Foy criticizes Marmont's account of the battle, and in particular his failure to give Clausel more credit:

  He does not recall his own lack of ability, his indecision, his agonizing; while his pride and idea of himself makes him regard his friends and generals of division as being in a different class from himself whose petty interests should be sacrificed to his personal vanity. He thinks he has rewarded Clausel sufficiently by referring vaguely in his report to his bravery and constant exposure to enemy fire.17

  The vehemence of this denunciation suggests that Foy was far from being a cool detached observer, while the criticism of Marmont's pride and willingness to sacrifice his subordinates gives an impression of pique, as if Foy had expected more influence over Marmont than he was able to exert. But his opinion cannot be simply dismissed, even though the evidence of events, and particularly the manoeuvres after the crossing of the Duero, would suggest a more generous verdict.